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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David Aaron Knutsen appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
V. M. has a full-scale IQ of 72, which puts her in the borderline intellectual
functioning range. (Trial Tr., p. 531, L. 5 - p. 533, L. 4.) Her IQ measure "means
that her intellectual functioning is below average, below low average, and is right
on the edge of someone in the extremely low range." (Trial Tr., p. 533, Ls. 1721.) She has impaired decision-making capacity because of her slow speed in
both assessing situations requiring a decision and in reasoning through the
benefits and consequences of her potential choices. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 - p.
535, L. 17.)

She would normally have difficulty making decisions, and that

difficulty would be aggravated by depression. (Trial Tr., p. 540, L. 21 - p. 541, L.
7.)

Ultimately V.M. is a person over the age of 18 "who is unable to protect

[herself] from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of mental or physical
impairments." (Trial Tr., p. 542, L. 1 - p. 544, L. 5.)
V.M. was living in an Intensive Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded.
(Trial Tr., p. 396, L. 18 - p. 397, L. 18.) Because she became suicidal she was
moved into the Canyon View mental health facility. (Trial Tr., p. 406, L. 11 - p.
407, L. 19; p. 410, L. 9- p. 411, L. 16.) At Canyon View she met Knutsen in the
TV room. (Trial Tr., p. 412, L. 11 - p. 414, L. 23.)
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Knutsen later came and sat at the same table when V.M. was in the
cafeteria. (Trial Tr., p. 419, L. 16 - p. 422,

12.) Knutsen started asking "very

personal questions" such as whether she was a virgin, whether she was wearing
a bra, and how she, as a virgin, "pleasure[d her]self." (Trial Tr., p. 422, L. 13 - p.
425, L. 8.) He also told her, in response to her statement that she was a virgin,
"[W]e can do something about that." (Trial Tr., p. 444, L. 1 - p. 445, L. 12.)
V.M. was initially flattered by the attention because she had "never really
had a guy pay attention to [her] like that." (Trial Tr., p. 425, Ls. 10-19.) Flattery
became fear, however, when, making a suggestive motion with his fingers,
Knutsen asked how big her nipples were. (Trial Tr., p. 426, L. 1 - p. 427, L. 7.)
When Knutsen asked to feel her breasts she said "yes" because she "was scared
at the time."

(Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 8-21.)

While he felt her breast he "was

watching the nurses' station, because the nurses could see right into the
cafeteria." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 22-25.)
After touching her breasts he used his bare foot to "push[] [her] legs open"
and then rub her vagina under the table. (Trial Tr., p. 428, L. 1 - p. 429, L. 7.)
Again, while doing this he was "watching the nurses' station the whole time."
(Trial Tr., p. 430, Ls. 2-11.)
After rubbing her vagina with his foot, Knutsen asked to see her vagina.
(Trial Tr., p. 430, Ls. 12-15.) She said yes because she was "scared out of [her]
mind." (Id.) He took her behind pop machines, so as to be out of the view of the
nurses. (Trial Tr., p. 430, L. 16 - p. 434, L. 12; State's Exhibits 3, 4.) He asked
her to pull down her pants, which she did. (Trial Tr., p. 434, L. 13 - p. 435, L.
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14.) Knutsen told her "he would like that, that was nice" and touched his penis
over his pants. (Trial Tr., p. 435,

15 - p. 437, L. 9.) He then touched her

vagina and breasts with his hands. (Trial Tr., p. 437, L. 20 - p. 438, L. 15.) He
also had her touch his penis through his pants. (Trial Tr., p. 446, L. 20 - p. 447,
L. 22.)

Knutsen and V.M. went back to a table in the cafeteria, and Knutsen again
touched her vagina with his foot, again while watching out for the nurses. (Trial
Tr., p. 445, L. 16 - p. 446, L. 19.) As V.M. was walking out Knutsen told her to
wait and, when she did, he again touched her breast and vagina, and told her he
intended to go "jack off." (Trial Tr., p. 448, L. 14 - p. 449, L. 8.)
V.M. was "really scared" and "didn't know what to do," but when a nurse
kept asking her what was wrong she finally told the nurse. (Trial Tr., p. 450, Ls.
8-22.)
A grand jury indicted Knutsen for four counts of sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult.

(R., pp. 12-14.)

Knutsen moved to dismiss the indictment,

alleging several violations of procedure associated with the grand jury. (R., pp.
52-55.) He also filed a motion to have the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult
statute, I.C. § 18-1505B, declared constitutionally void and overbroad. (R., pp.
57-61.) The district court denied both motions. (R., pp. 183-99, 207-40.) The
matter proceeded to trial (R., pp. 351-52, 371-76; see generally Trial Tr.), at the
conclusion of which the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts (R., pp.
403-05).
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After trial Knutsen absconded.

(R., pp. 417-18.) He was subsequently

incarcerated in Nevada on felony charges. (R., p. 419.) A warrant for his arrest
in this case was served on him over two years after the original sentencing
hearing.

(R., p. 430.)

The district court ultimately imposed four concurrent

sentences of 25 years with 18 years determinate. (R., pp. 487-92.) Knutsen filed
a notice of appeal, timely from entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 494-96.)

4

ISSUES
Knutsen's statement of the issues is found in the Appellant's brief at page
7. Due to its length it is not reproduced here. The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

The district court determined that because its order started the grand jury
term once it was "selected and convened," the time to measure the term
was from when the grand jury first met to consider possible indictments
instead of some other time. Has Knutsen failed to show error in the
district court's interpretation of its own order?

2.

Has Knutsen failed to show that the sexual abuse of vulnerable adults
statute is constitutionally deficient, either on its face or as applied to his
conduct?

3.

Has Knutsen failed to show error in the district court's rejection of his
proposed jury instruction that consent was a defense to a charge of sexual
abuse of a vulnerable adult?

4.

Is Knutsen's claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions without merit?

5.

Has Knutsen failed to show fundamental error in his four convictions
based on a claim of double jeopardy?

5

ARGUMENT

I.
Knutsen Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That
The Grand Jury Acted Within Its Term
A.

Introduction
On November 13, 2008, the district court issued an order that a grand jury

be "summoned and convened in Twin Falls County, on the 14th day of November
2008."

(Order Summoning and Convening Grand Jury, p. 1 (Augmentation)

(hereinafter "Order").) The Order also states that "once selected and convened,
the grand jury shall serve a term of four months until discharged by the Court."
(Order, p. 2.) The judge instructed the grand jury that this meant they would be
meeting on alternate Wednesdays starting December 3, 2008 and ending on
March 25, 2009. (Grand Jury Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-17.) The grand jury returned the
indictment in this case on its last meeting, on March 25, 2009. (R., p. 12.)
Knutsen moved to dismiss, asserting the grand jury "acted without
jurisdiction" because it met "after the expiration of the four month term specified"
in the court's order convening the grand jury.

(R., p. 53.)

The district court

rejected this claim for two reasons. First, it concluded that, pursuant to the order
convening it, the grand jury began its four-month term when it was "selected and
convened," which happened at its first post-selection convening, on December 3,
2008.

(R., pp. 210-11.)

Second, it concluded that "even if this grand jury

convened outside of the four-month window" of the written order, it "still had
jurisdiction" because the court orally extended the term when it ordered the jury
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to meet on March 25, 2009, which was within the six month jurisdictional period
allowed by law. (R., pp. 211-14.)
Although the district court concluded the grand jury had jurisdiction on two
bases, Knutsen challenges only the first on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-12.)
This Court must therefore affirm the district court on the unchallenged basis for
its ruling. Moreover, even if both bases are reviewed on the merits, Knutsen has
failed to show any error by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate court's] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal." State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)).

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free

review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.
The interpretation of an unambiguous court order presents a question of
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Suchan v. Suchan, 113
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986); Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie
Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App.
1993). The interpretation of an ambiguous court order presents a question of
fact.

Suchan, 113 Idaho at 106, 741 P.2d at 1293.

Where the order is

reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, the appellate court must accept
the trial court's interpretation, particularly when the trial court is interpreting its
7

own order, unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous.

KL at 107-08, 741 P.2d

at 1294-95 (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court's Ruling Must Be Affirmed On The Unchallenged
Holding That It Orally Ordered The Grand Jury To Meet On March 25,
2009
Where a basis for a ruling by a district court is unchallenged on appeal,

the appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. See State v. Goodwin,
131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). Here Knutsen does
not challenge the district court's conclusion that it orally ordered the grand jury to
meet on March 25, 2009, within the six months allowed by law, and therefore the
grand jury had jurisdiction on that date. (Compare R., pp. 211-14 (holding that
the grand jury had jurisdiction because the court orally ordered it to convene on
March 25, 2009, within the six months allowed by law), with Appellant's brief, pp.
8-12 (failing to acknowledge or address the district court's holding that by orally
ordering the grand jury to meet on March 25, 2009 such meeting was within its
ordered term).) The district court's ruling must be affirmed on the unchallenged
basis.

D.

Knutsen Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Interpretation Of Its
Own Order As Starting The Term Of The Grand Jury On December 3,
2008 And Discharging It After March 25, 2009
Even if this Court chooses to review the merits of the order denying the

motion to dismiss, no error is shown. A grand jury lacks jurisdiction to issue an
indictment outside its legal term of service. State v. Dalling, 128 Idaho 203, 206,
911 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1996). "A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the
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court but no grand jury shall serve more than six (6) months unless specifically
ordered by the court which summoned the grand jury." I.C.R. 6.8. There is no
dispute that the grand jury returned the current indictment within six months.
Rather, the only issue presented is whether the grand jury had been "discharged
by the court" prior to March 25, 2009. Review of the record clearly shows it was
not.
First, the grand jury was not discharged by the Order summoning it. The
Order provided that a grand jury "be summoned and convened" on November 14,
2008. (Order, p. 1.) It further ordered that the grand jury serve a four month
term "once selected and convened." (Order, p. 2.) The difference in the wording
shows that the term did not start with the summoning and selection of the grand
jury, but only after the grand jury had been "selected." The November 14, 2008
hearing at which the grand jury was selected was not contemplated to be within
the term specified in the order. Thus, the term started the first time the grand jury
convened post-selection, on December 3, 2008.

The district court's ruling is

supported by the plain language of the order and, to the extent the language is
ambiguous, the district court's interpretation of its own order requires deference. 1
Moreover, there is no basis in the record to believe that the court
discharged the grand jury prior to March 25, 2009. Even if the written order could
be interpreted as starting the four-month term on November 14, 2008, the court's

That the district court interpreted it order from the beginning as starting the four
month term with the first meeting to hear potential cases is demonstrated by the
fact the court instructed the grand jury to meet in the four months from December
to March.
1
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instruction to the grand jury to meet on March 25, 2009, cannot be interpreted as
anything other than the court's intention that the grand jury not be discharged
prior to that date. In short, there is nothing in the record indicating that the grand
jury was in fact discharged prior to March 25, 2009.
Because the Rule provides that the grand jury serves for six months or
until discharged, and because the grand jury returned the present indictment
within six months and without having been discharged, Knutsen's argument the
grand jury lacked jurisdiction is without merit.

11.
Knutsen Has Shown No Constitutional Infirmity Of The Sexual Abuse Of A
Vulnerable Adult Statute

A

Introduction
Knutsen throws the constitutional kitchen sink at the sexual abuse of a

vulnerable adult statute, asserting it is unconstitutionally overbroad (Appellant's
brief, pp. 13-25); infringes upon his due process right to private, consensual
conduct as applied (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-26); violated his right to substantive
due process (Appellant's brief, pp. 27-29); violated his right to equal protection
(Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30); is void for vagueness (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-40);
and is vague as applied (Appellant's brief, pp. 40-43).

Of these constitutional

arguments, only the claims that the statute is overboard, void for vagueness, and
vague as applied are preserved. (R., pp. 183-99.) Knutsen has failed to show
that the district court erred in rejecting them. As to the claims presented for the
first time on appeal (that application of the statute violated his rights to privacy,
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substantive due process, and equal protection), Knutsen has failed to show
fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de nova.

State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131

(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the
statute.

kl The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute

that upholds its constitutionality.

C.

kl

Knutsen Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determinations
That The Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Not Void For
Vagueness, Overbroad, Or Vague As Applied
1.

The Statute Is Not Void For Vagueness

"A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute
or regulation under which it is obtained 'fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement."' F.C.C. v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., _

U.S. _ , 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quoting

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).

Thus, "the void-for-

vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary
and discriminatory prosecutions." Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, _ ,
130 S.Ct. 2896, 2933 (2010). Statutes, however, have a "strong presumption of
validity" and the court must, if it can, "construe, not condemn" them.
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kl, 130

S.Ct. at 2928 (internal quotes and cites omitted).

That "close cases can be

envisioned" is insufficient to "render[] a statute vague" because the state must
still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 305-06 (2008).

Even if a statute's "outermost boundaries" are

"imprecise," such uncertainty has "little relevance" if the "appellant's conduct falls
squarely within the 'hard core' of the statute's proscriptions."

Broadrick v.

Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); see also Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2933 (citing
Broadrick). Furthermore, sufficient clarity "may be supplied by judicial gloss on
an otherwise uncertain statute."

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266

(1997).
There is nothing vague about the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult
statute, much less vagueness rising to the level of rendering the statute beyond
construction and requiring condemnation.

The statute prohibits "any person"

from "caus[ing] or hav[ing] sexual contact with a vulnerable adult" with the "intent
of arousing, appealing to or gratifying" his or her own or another's "lust, passion
or sexual desires." I.C. § 18-1505B. The phrases "any person" and "caus[ing] or
hav[ing] sexual contact" and the language describing sexual intent are straightforward and clear, and do not seem to be at issue here.
The definition of the phrase "vulnerable adult" appears to be the part of the
statute Knutsen challenges:
a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to
protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical
or mental impairment which affects the person's judgment or
behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding
his person, funds, property or resources.
12

LC. § 18-1505(4)(e). Although this definition is broad (it applies to several types
of abuse or exploitation of vulnerable adults) it is not vague.

A person is a

"vulnerable adult" if he or she is 18 or over, has a "physical or mental impairment"
that affects "judgment or behavior" such that the person "lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions
regarding his person, funds, property or resources" and the person is "unable to
protect himself." A person of ordinary intelligence is provided notice of what this
statute prohibits.
Knutsen makes no actual claim that the language of the statute is vague.
Rather, he merely asserts that the prosecutor's argument was vague, that there
are hypothetical scenarios where he believes the application of the statute is not
clear, and complains about the lack of a scienter or fiduciary capacity element.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 37-40.)

These arguments show, at best, that the

"outermost boundaries" of this statute may be "imprecise" or that "close cases
can be envisioned." Neither of these is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
validity that must be applied to this statute. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 305-06;
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608.

The statute clearly prohibits the sexual abuse of

adults who cannot protect themselves from such abuse due to physical or mental
impairment that makes them vulnerable because of reduced capacity.
vague, much less void-for-vagueness.
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It is not

2.

The Statute Is Not Overbroad

"To succeed in a typical facial attack, [the appellant] would have to
establish that no set of circumstances exist under which [the statute] would be
valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep." United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). 2 There is a
"second type of facial challenge," established by demonstrating that a
"substantial

number"

of

the

challenged

statute's

applications

are

"unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," but
such applies only in "the First Amendment context."

~

at 473 (internal

quotations omitted).
Although Knutsen argues for application of the second type of facial
challenge, the constitutional right he invokes is not grounded in the First
Amendment, but rather in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-79 (2003). 3 "The fact that

The Supreme Court of the United States has not resolved which of these two
legal standards "applies in a typical case." Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. Knutsen
claims the Idaho Supreme Court has erred by adopting the first standard, that "no
set of circumstances exists" under which the statute would be valid, and that
cases applying that standard should be overruled. (Appellant's brief, pp. 32-35.)
Absent resolution of that issue by the Supreme Court of the United States,
Knutsen has failed to show grounds for reversing Idaho precedent. Regardless,
his claim fails under either standard.
2

Knutsen engages a "bait and switch," asserting that the right he is invoking is
also protected by the First Amendment right of association. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 19-20.) While the authority he asserts is sufficient to establish that there is a
First Amendment right of association, he cites nothing indicating it protects
sexual contact of the sort at issue here. The only relevant authority he cites for
constitutional protection of private, consensual sex by adults is Lawrence
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19), which, as noted, is rooted in due process, not the
First Amendment.
3
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[a statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' challenge outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

Because

there is no viable claim that the statute in question potentially violates the First
Amendment, Knutsen bears the burden of demonstrating that there is "no set of
circumstances" where the statute may be constitutionally applied or that "the
statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep."
Knutsen has not tried to bear this burden, and in fact any effort would
prove futile.

In the case of a truly non-consenting victim the statute may be

constitutionally applied. State v. Hamlin,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL
1687137, at p. *8 (Idaho App., 2014); State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262, 192
P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct. App. 2008). Because there is no viable First Amendment
challenge to the statute, Knutsen must show that the statute is unconstitutional in
all its applications or that it has no plainly legitimate sweep. Because he has
neither tried nor succeeded in bearing that burden his argument must be
rejected.

3.

The Statute Is Not Vague As Applied

To show that the statute is vague "as applied" a defendant "must show
that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice
that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to
arrest him." State v. Ruggiero,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 1660728,
15

at p. *8 (Idaho App., 2014) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d
126, 132 (2003)).

The question is whether the statute, "read as a whole,"

"provides fair notice of the conduct that it prohibits." State v. Alley, 155 Idaho
972, _ , 318 P.3d 962, 973 (Ct. App. 2014). Furthermore, "a statute need not
provide absolute precision in describing the exact conduct that it covers; only fair
notice understandable by persons of ordinary intelligence is required."

kl

In Ruggiero the "plain language of the statute provided fair notice that it
was illegal for Ruggiero to prepare false documents and submit them to the
magistrate with the intent they be produced in his criminal proceeding 'as true
and genuine' for a 'fraudulent or deceitful purpose .... "

kl Likewise, in this case

the plain language of the statute gave ample notice that it was unlawful to have
sexual contact with a vulnerable adult. This statute is similar to sex crimes based
on the age of the victim, such as statutory rape or lewd and lascivious conduct
with a minor: That the age of the victim may not have been readily apparent to
the defendant does not render those statutes vague. Likewise, even assuming
the veracity of Knutsen's claim that the facts as he understood them did not
provide notice that C.M. was a vulnerable adult, 4 such did not make the notice
provided by the plain language of the statute vague. Knutsen's claim that the
statute is vague as applied to him is without merit.

Of course the state disputes Knutsen's factual claims. V.M.'s mental limitations
would have been readily apparent and the fact Knutsen encountered her in a
mental health facility was at least an indication she may have a reduced capacity.
4
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D.

Knutsen Has Failed To Show, Pursuant To The Fundamental Error
Standard, That Application Of The Statute Violated His Rights To
Consensual Sexual Activity, Substantive Due Process, And Equal
Protection
Although Knutsen's motion stated it was based on "the right to due

process of law and equal protection" (R., pp. 57, 77), the only due process claims
asserted in the arguments supporting the motion were vagueness (facial and as
applied) and overbreadth (R., pp. 57-61, 77-86), and "equal protection" is
nowhere else mentioned (Id.). The district court also concluded that there were
three issues presented by Knutsen; namely that the statute was void for
vagueness, vague as applied, and overbroad.

(R., p. 138 (identifying three

issues raised by the motion to dismiss).) Knutsen did not object to the scope of
the district court's ruling on his motion or request clarification or reconsideration.
(See generally, R.)
On appeal Knutsen argues that holding him criminally accountable
infringed upon his due process right to private, consensual conduct (Appellant's
brief, pp. 25-26); violated his right to substantive due process (Appellant's brief,
pp. 27-29); and violated his right to equal protection (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30).
Because these claims were neither raised nor ruled on below, they are not
preserved for appellate review.

See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v.

MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 491, 224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009) ("Even
though an issue was argued to the court, to preserve an issue for appeal there
must be a ruling by the court."); see also Kolas v. Cassia County Idaho, 142
Idaho 346, 354, 127 P.3d 962, 970 (2005) ("To properly preserve an issue for
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appeal, one must either receive an adverse ruling on the issue or raise it in the
court below.").
In a criminal case, where an issue is not preserved it may only be
reviewed for fundamental error. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 924, 245 P.3d
961, 976 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must show a violation
of an unwaived constitutional right; that the error is clear or obvious; and that the
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. lg_,_ at 226, 245 P.3d at 978;
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 2012).
Knutsen has not attempted, much less succeeded, to show fundamental error.

1.

The Record Does Not Establish Knutsen Was Engaged In
Constitutionally Protected Conduct

The state may not criminalize the private sexual conduct of two adu Its,
undertaken "with full and mutual consent from each other." Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

"However, Lawrence makes clear that this

constitutional protection does not apply to nonconsensual acts, including sex with
those incapable of consenting." State v. Hamlin, _

Idaho_, _

P.3d _ ,

2014 WL 1687137, at p. *7 (Idaho App., 2014). Likewise, sexual conduct that
occurs in public is not protected.

State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 263-64, 192

P.3d 1085, 1087-88 (Ct. App. 2008).
Knutsen claims that the "trial reveals that two adults ... engaged in
consensual sexual contact." (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) This claim is viable only if
this Court declines to read the transcript. V.M. was in the borderline intellectual
functioning range and "right on the edge" of the extremely low range. (Trial Tr.,
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p. 531, L. 5 - p. 533, L. 21.) Her decision-making capacity was impaired by slow
speed in both assessing situations requiring a decision and in reasoning through
the benefits and consequences of her potential choices. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 p. 535, L. 17.) Her already impaired decision-making skills were further impaired
by depression. (Trial Tr., p. 540, L. 21 - p. 541, L. 7; p. 406, L. 11 - p. 407, L.
19; p. 410, L. 9 - p. 411, L. 16.) Ultimately V.M. is a person over the age of 18
"who is unable to protect [herself] from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of
mental or physical impairments." (Trial Tr., p. 542, L. 1 - p. 544, L. 5.) She
testified herself that she said yes to Knutsen's aggressive sexual advances
despite being "scared out of [her] mind." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 8-21; p. 430, Ls.
12-15; p. 450, Ls. 8-22.) The evidence clearly shows she acquiesced from a
combination of Knutsen's pressure and her mental and emotional incapacity.
Knutsen's claim that the evidence establishes the opposite is specious.
Moreover, Knutsen makes no claim that the conduct was private. Rather,
evidence conclusively establishes that the behavior was in the cafeteria of a
mental health facility where Knutsen kept a constant watch out for the nurses.
(Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 22-25; p. 430, Ls. 2-11; p. 445, L. 16 - p. 446, L. 19.) The
only thing keeping the claim that the conduct was private from being specious is
Knutsen's failure to make it.
Knutsen aggressively and in a predatory fashion convinced a young
woman suffering mental and emotional disabilities to acquiesce to sexual contact
in the cafeteria of a mental health facility. His claim he had a constitutional right
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to do so is demeaning to the Constitution. He has failed to present the whiff of a
valid claim of fundamental error.

2.

Knutsen Has Shown No Viable Claim Of A Violation Of His Rights
To Substantive Due Process

Knutsen invokes substantive due process based on his "right to privacy"
under Lawrence, admits the state has a "legitimate purpose in protecting all
citizens from nonconsensual sex," but claims the statute "simply does not meet
the State's legitimate purpose because it just defines an entire group of people
as incapable of consenting to sexual contact."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 27-29.)

Knutsen thus argues for application of the "strict scrutiny" test, with its attendant
requirement that the statute employ the least restrictive means to effectuate the
state interest. (Id.) This argument fails because, as set forth above, there is no
constitutionally protected conduct in this case.

Lawrence specifically excluded

nonconsensual sex such as is at issue in this case. Hamlin, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 1687137, at p. *7; Cook, 146 Idaho at 263-64, 192 P.3d at
1087-88. "Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ
suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome
only by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irregularity." State v. Bennett, 142
Idaho 166, 169, 125 P.3d 522, 525 (2005) (internal quotation and citations
omitted).

Because Knutsen had no constitutional right (fundamental or

otherwise) to sexually abuse a vulnerable adult, Knutsen must demonstrate that
there is no rational basis for prohibiting the sexual abuse of vulnerable adults.
State v. Sherman, _

Idaho_,

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 1281723, at pp. *2-3

20

(Idaho App., 2014). Knutsen makes no such claim, nor could he prevail on it if
he did.

Having failed to establish a violation of his substantive due process

rights, much less one that is clear on the record and prejudicial, Knutsen has
failed to establish fundamental error.

3.

Knutsen Has Failed To Show A Viable Claim Of A Violation Of His
Equal Protection Rights

The Supreme Court of the United States "has long held that a
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceedings along suspect
lines . .. cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational
relationship

between

the

disparity

of

treatment

and

governmental purpose." Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., _

some

legitimate

U.S._ 2073,

132 S.Ct. 2073, 2079-80 (2012) (internal quotes and citations omitted, ellipse
original). Thus, the "first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify the
classification at issue."

Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho 193, _ , 307 P .3d

1219, 1224 (2013) (internal quotes and citations omitted).

Where a party

claiming an equal protection violation has failed to identify a classification, the
Court will not review that claim because "this Court does not consider issues not
supported by argument or authority."

&

(internal quotes and citations omitted).

The classification Knutsen identifies is a distinction between married and
unmarried people. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30.) He admits his claim that the
statute distinguishes between married and unmarried people is not based on
statutory language, but instead on a claim that the legislature "presumed" that
married adults were "exempted from the law." (Id.) Having failed to identify an
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actual classification created by the law, Knutsen has failed to identify a
classification that the Court can consider, much less a classification that rises to
an equal protection fundamental error.

111.
Knutsen Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Rejection Of His Proposed
Consent Defense Instruction
A.

Introduction
When invited to put any objection to the proposed jury instructions on the

record, Knutsen's counsel referenced "constitutional issues" that had been
"litigated" and were subject to the district court's previously issued opinion. (Trial
Tr., p. 636, Ls. 4-13.) Counsel "object[ed] specifically to any instructions having
to do with strict liability or any instruction having to do with the defendant not
needing to know that a person has mental deficiencies and is, therefore, unable
to give informed consent."

(Trial Tr., p. 636, Ls. 13-20.)

The district court

instructed the jury that "it is not a defense ... that V.M. may have consented to
the alleged conduct." (R., p. 393.)
On appeal "Knutsen asserts that the district court should not have
provided the consent defense instruction." (Appellant's brief, p. 44. 5 ) However,
Knutsen has failed to establish that the instruction in any way misstated the law.
He has therefore failed to show error.

Knutsen argues in the alternative that the district court "should have utilized the
consent instruction applicable to rape involving a person of unsound mind."
(Appellant's brief, p. 44, 47-48.) Knutsen did not request that this instruction be
used at trial, however, and on appeal does not claim its omission amounts to
fundamental error. The alternative argument should, therefore, be disregarded
as unpreserved.
5
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B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). Whether a jury was properly instructed is a
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v.
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657,659, 8 P.3d 652,654 (2000)).

C.

Knutsen Has Failed To Show That Consent Is A Defense To Sexual
Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult
It is a felony for "any person" to have "sexual contact with a vulnerable

adult" "with the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion or
sexual desires of such person." I.C. § 18-15058(1). The jury was instructed on
these elements. (R., pp. 385-88.) The jury was also instructed with the statutory
definition of the phrase "vulnerable adult." (R., p. 389.) In order to find Knutsen
guilty it had to find that Knutsen engaged in specific acts of touching (touching
V.M.'s genitals with his foot, touching her genitals with his hand, touching her
breasts with his hand, and having her touch his genitals with her hand), that such
touching was with sexual intent, and that V.M. was an adult who was "unable to
protect herself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental
impairment" which affected her "judgment or behavior to the extent" that she
lacked "sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or
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implement decisions about her person, funds, property, or resources." (R., pp.
385-89.)
Lacking from the statute is any defense of consent. That V.M. said yes
because she was "scared out of [her] mind" did not provide Knutsen with a
defense. (Trial Tr., p. 430, Ls. 12-15.) The district court properly instructed the
jury that evidence that V.M. said yes to her own abuse was not a defense
available to Knutsen under the plain language and elements of the statute.
Knutsen first argues that V.M.'s testimony that she said yes was a defense
because "the only time that consent of victim [sic] is no defense is when the
charge involves a child under age." (Appellant's brief, p. 46.) As authority for
this broad claim Knutsen cites State v. Herr, 97 Idaho 783, 554 P.2d 961 ( 1976),
and State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 924 P.2d 599 (1996). (Appellant's brief, p. 46.)
In Herr the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to give, in a trial
for lewd conduct with a child, an instruction on an included offense of fornication
on the grounds that fornication was not an included offense because it had an
element, consent, not present in the crime of lewd conduct with a child. Herr, 97
Idaho at 786-87, 554 P.2d 964-65. In Oar the Court held that consent is not a
defense to a charge of sexual battery of a child. Oar, 129 Idaho 340, 924 P.2d at
602. These cases do not support the argument that the legislature was required
to or in fact did include consent as a defense to sexual abuse of a vulnerable
adult.
Knutsen next argues that had the court not instructed the jury that consent
was not a defense he would have had "more room to argue the meaning of
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vulnerable adult as it relates to the charges, and whether or not V.M. had the
capacity to protect herself from abuse." (Appellant's brief, p. 46. 6) The state is
unaware of any legal basis for a "more room to argue" for an acquittal legal
standard, and Knutsen cites no legal authority for it. A defendant is not entitled
to an erroneous statement of the law, see State v. Johns, 122 Idaho 873, 881,
736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987), regardless of how much it would improve, from his
perspective, his closing argument.
Knutsen has cited no law indicating that he was not guilty of sexual abuse
of a vulnerable adult because he got the victim to say "yes" in the course of
sexually abusing her. Because the instructions were accurate statements of the
law, and Knutsen has failed to show otherwise, Knutsen has failed to show
error. 7

Knutsen likewise argues he was "unable to argue that V.M. had the ability to
protect herself from sexual contact." (Appellant's brief, p. 48.) This claim is
false. The jury was instructed that before it could convict it would have to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that V.M. was "unable to protect herself from abuse,
neglect or exploitation." (R., p. 389.) The instruction that consent was not a
defense in no way prevented Knutsen from arguing the elements of the crime.
6

Because the jury found V.M. to be a vulnerable adult and the evidence shows
that V.M. said "yes" under conditions that show she did not give knowing and
voluntary consent, any error is also harmless. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209,
222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010) (error will be deemed harmless if, beyond a
reasonable doubt, it did not contribute to the conviction).
7
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IV.
Knutsen Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Of His Guilt Is Insufficient To
Support His Convictions
Introduction

A.

Knutsen argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict because the jury could not reasonably conclude that V.M. was unable to
protect herself from abuse.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 49-52.)

In making this

argument Knutsen cites to evidence he believes supports a conclusion other than
that reached by the jury, but fails to acknowledge evidence supporting the jury's
verdict.

(R., p. 51.)

Review of the evidence supporting the jury's conclusion

shows more than substantial evidence supporting the verdict.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are

construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
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698, 701, 946 P .2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761 , 735 P.2d
at 1072.

C.

Knutsen Has Failed To Show Any Inadequacy In The Evidence
To show that V.M. was a vulnerable adult the state had the burden of

proving that V.M. was "unable to protect [herself] from abuse, neglect or
exploitation."

I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e).

The evidence amply supports the jury's

finding on this matter.
V. M. was in the borderline intellectual functioning range with an overall IQ
score of 72, which is "right on the edge" of the extremely low range. (Trial Tr., p.
531, L. 5 - p. 533, L. 23.) Her decision-making capacity was impaired by slow
speed in both assessing situations requiring a decision and in reasoning through
the benefits and consequences of her potential choices. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 p. 535, L. 17.)

V.M.'s already impaired decision-making skills were further

impaired by depression. (Trial Tr., p. 540, L. 21 - p. 541, L. 7; p. 406, L. 11 - p.
407, L. 19; p. 410, L. 9 - p. 411, L. 16.)

"[l]n a decision that's going to be

complex, where there's a lot of information or a lot of things to consider, [for]
someone with an IQ of 72 it's going to be quite challenging for them without
some extra assistance." (Trial Tr., p. 535, Ls. 9-13.)
The psychological evidence that V.M. would be overwhelmed by having to
make difficult or complex decisions is confirmed by V.M.'s testimony that she
said yes to Knutsen's aggressive sexual advances despite being "scared out of
[her] mind." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 8-21; p. 430, Ls. 12-15; p. 450, Ls. 8-22.)
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Finally, if the above were not enough, Dr. Hogland specifically testified
that, in her professional opinion, V.M. is a vulnerable adult because she meets
the statutory criteria of being a person over the age of 18 "who is unable to
protect [herself] from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of mental or
physical impairments." (Trial Tr., p. 542, L. 22 - p. 544, L. 5. 8) The evidence
supports the finding that V.M. was incapable of protecting herself from sexual
abuse by Knutsen because of her mental limitations.
In claiming otherwise, Knutsen first cites Dr. Hogland's testimony that with
education V.M. would be able to understand what sexual interaction is.
(Appellant's brief, p. 51; compare Trial Tr., p. 552, L. 17 - p. 555, L. 15.) Of
course evidence that V.M. has the ability to learn in the future what sexual
interaction is directly refutes any claim that she possessed that understanding at
the time of the crime. This evidence actually cuts for the state's position.
Knutsen points out that V.M.'s full IQ score is two points above formal
classification as mentally retarded and that her verbal subtest score is 81, in the
low normal range.

(Appellant's brief, p. 51.) The statute, however, does not

require formal classification as mentally retarded.

1.C. § 18-15056(1).

Furthermore, the clinical psychologist testified that the more relevant IQ subtest
score was in processing speed, which was 71, and indicated that V.M. would
have trouble making decisions. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 - p. 538, L. 17.) The

This testimony belies Knutsen's claim "[t]here was no evidence that V.M. should
have been qualified as a vulnerable adult because she was unable to protect
herself from abuse due to her mental impairment." (Appellant's brief, p. 51.)

8
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evidence regarding V.M.'s IQ supports the jury's verdict, rather than showing it
unreasonable.
Knutsen finally points out evidence that V.M. graduated from high school
and argues she "received Bs and Cs in the more difficult classes." (Appellant's
brief, p. 51.)

However, in high school she mostly took "[s]pecial ed resource

classes" that were "not ... normal classes" but were for "people that had learning
disabilities."

(Trial Tr., p. 403, Ls. 18-23.) She got Bs and Cs in her non-special

education classes, such as "[c]ooking class and history class" and "computer
classes" (Trial Tr., p. 460, Ls. 4-23), but such achievement hardly removes her
from being vulnerable to predators like Knutsen.
Ultimately Knutsen's argument is merely that there is evidence in the
record that he believes supports his argument that V.M. was not unable to
protect herself from sexual abuse. Simply ignoring the considerable evidence to
the contrary, however, does not render the jury verdict unreasonable or
unsupported by evidence. When all of the evidence is considered the jury verdict
is eminently reasonable.

V.
Knutsen Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In His Multiple Punishments For
Multiple Crimes

A.

Introduction
Knutsen asserts, for the first time on appeal, that his four crimes are in fact

"one offense" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Appellant's brief, pp.
52-55.) He has failed to show any violation of his rights against double jeopardy,
much less fundamental error.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).

C.

Knutsen Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Imposing Four
Sentences Upon His Four Convictions
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no

person shall 'be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."'

Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980).

"At its root, the Double

Jeopardy Clause forbids the duplicative prosecution of a defendant for the 'same
offense."'

United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385 (1992).

The Double

Jeopardy Clause "serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors," but
the legislature "remains free" to "define crimes and fix punishments." Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Thus, the test for what constitutes "the same
offense" is "one of legislative intent." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 77879 (1985).
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"'There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from
punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction
which it has power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction."'
Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779 (emphasis original) (quoting Albrecht v. United States,
273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927)).

If the "applicable [Idaho] statutes" make the different

sexual contacts in this case "a single offense," then the double jeopardy bar
applies.

See Brown, 432 U.S. at 169.

If, however, "the [Idaho] legislature

provided that" each act of sexual touching is itself a crime, we "have a different
case."

kl

at 169 n.8.

Application of the legal standard articulated by the

Supreme Court of the United States to the facts of this case shows that Knutsen
was properly charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for four separate crimes.
The grand jury indicted Knutsen on four counts of sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult. Count I alleged that Knutsen "did cause or have sexual contact
... not amounting to lewd conduct" by "touching V.M.'s genitals with his foot."
(R., p. 13.) Count II alleged that Knutsen "did commit a lewd and\or lascivious

act" by "touching V.M.'s genitals with his hand." (R., p. 13.) Count Ill alleged that
Knutsen "did cause or have sexual contact ... not amounting to lewd conduct" by
"touching V.M.'s breasts with his hand(s)." (R., p. 13.) Count IV alleged that
Knutsen "did commit a lewd and\or lascivious act" by "having V.M. touch his
genitals with her hand." (R., p. 14.) Counts II and IV were charged under I.C. §
18-1505B(1)(a), while Counts I and Ill were charged under I.C. § 18-15058(1)(c).
(R., pp. 13-14.) Thus, all four counts charge a different type of touching and
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invoke two different subsections of the relevant statute. These distinctions show
that Knutsen committed four, not one, offenses.
First, the counts charged under subsection (a) and those charged under
subsection (c) both have elements different than the other, and therefore do not
offend double jeopardy. Under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court of
the United States, "the same act or transaction" may be prosecuted and
punished under "two distinct statutory provisions" if "each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (quoting Blockburger
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)). See also Vitale, 447 U.S. at 416 ("if each

statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, the offenses
are not the same under the 8/ockburger test" (internal quotations and citations
omitted, emphasis original)).
fact the other does not.

Here the two different statutes require proof of a

I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(a) requires proof the defendant

"[c]ommit[ted] any lewd or lascivious act or acts" while I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(c)
requires proof the defendant "[c]ause[d] or [had] sexual contact ... not amounting
to lewd conduct as defined in paragraph (a)." Application of the Blockburger test
shows that conviction and sentencing for two crimes for violating both I.C. § 181505B(1)(a) and I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(c), based on two different and mutually
exclusive types of sexual touching, do not infringe upon any double jeopardy
rights.
Second, Knutsen was not convicted for the same crime in any of the four
counts, because each charged a different act of touching.

The lewd and

lascivious acts that violated subsection (a) were, respectively, Knutsen touching
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V.M.'s genitals with his hand and having her touch his genitals with her hand.
(R., pp. 13-14.)

The sexual touching not amounting to lewd and lascivious

conduct were separate acts of touching V.M.'s genitals with his foot and touching
her breasts with his hands·. (R., p. 13.) There is nothing in the statute that would
make these four separate acts of sexual touching one crime. No one of them is a
lesser included offense of any other. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,
705-08 (1993) (holdings of prior cases finding double jeopardy "rest[] squarely
upon the existence of a lesser included offense"). Acquittal on any count would
not have required acquittal on any other, nor would conviction on any one count
required conviction on any other.

Because the legislature has not defined

separate acts of sexual contact as a single crime, the four acts of sexual contact
Knutsen perpetrated were not "the same offense" and therefore not within the
scope of double jeopardy protections.
Knutsen advances a legal standard by which "one continuing transaction"
must be deemed the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. (Appellant's
brief, p. 54.) This legal standard is not meaningfully distinguishable from the
"same transaction rule" espoused by Justice Brennan, under which "all charges
growing out of conduct constituting a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or
transaction must be tried in a single proceeding."

Brown, 432 U.S. at 170

(Brennan, J. concurring) (internal quotes omitted). However, the Supreme Court
of the United States has "steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transaction'
view of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 790; see also Dixon,
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509 U.S. at 709 n.14 ("the same transaction rule ... has been consistently
rejected by the Court").
As set forth above, the Court has continually held that the proper analysis
is of legislative intent, with the starting point being that where the legislature
criminalized the same conduct with different statutes, each having an element
not found in the other, the legislature intended both statutes to apply such that
they did not constitute the "same offense."
In support of his argument that "part[s] of one continuing transaction" are
the same offense for double jeopardy purposes Knutsen cites two cases, State v.
Major, 111 Idaho 410, 725 P.2d 115 (1986), and State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423,
725 P.2d 128 (1986).

(Appellant's brief, p. 54.)

In the latter case, the victim

"testified that Estes had entered her room and forcibly raped her four times."
Estes, 111 Idaho at 424, 725 P.2d at 129.

On appeal Estes argued the "trial

court erred by refusing to require the prosecution to elect which of the four acts of
sexual intercourse forcibly committed upon [the victim] it would rely on in seeking
to prove the crime of rape" because "Idaho Criminal Rule 8 requires that each
crime be charged in a separate count."

kl at 427,

725 P.2d at 132. At no point

in the opinion does the court even mention double jeopardy, much less apply
double jeopardy legal analysis. The Court's rejection of Estes' argument, finding
no violation of I.C.R. 8 because that rule allows joinder of offenses constituting a
common scheme, id., has no obvious relevance to this case. That four acts of
rape could be pursued as one count without violating I.C.R. 8 does not
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reasonably translate to a conclusion that punishing four acts of sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult as four offenses violates double jeopardy.
The Major case is no more helpful to Knutsen.

In that case Major

challenged her conviction on a single count of grand theft by possession on two
grounds: First that the state court lacked jurisdiction because she was an Indian
and the crime occurred in Indian country and, second, that the amendment of the
information to include the property later-recovered outside the reservation to the
single count of grand theft violated I.C.R. 7(e). 111 Idaho at 412-13, 725 P.2d at
117-18. Although this opinion at least mentions double jeopardy, id. at 414, 725
P.2d at 119, there was no claim of a double jeopardy violation before the Court.
Thus, any discussion of double jeopardy is, at best, dicta. 9 State v. Hawkins, 155
Idaho 69, _ , 305 P.3d 513, 518 (2013) (dicta is a statement "not necessary to
decide the issue presented to the appellate court" and is "not controlling").
In deciding that the information was properly amended, the Court adopted
a test used "in the context of deciding the propriety of aggregating several small
larcenous acts into one charge of grand larceny," namely, whether the stolen
items were "possessed as part of 'a single incident or pursuant to a common
scheme

or

plan

reflecting

a

single,

continuing

[criminal]

impulse

or

In addition, the Court relied on and quoted State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69, 383
P.2d 602, 606 (1963), for the proposition that "[w]hether a course of criminal
conduct should be divided or aggregated depends on whether or not the conduct
constituted 'separate, distinct and independent crimes."' Major, 111 Idaho at
414,725 P.2d at 119. This part of Hall, however, was expressly overruled in
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,211, 731 P.2d 192, 206 (1987), which applied a
legal standard addressing whether the convictions were for included offenses.
Thus, the dictum in Major is no longer good law for this reason also.
9
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intent."' Major, 111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119 (brackets original, quoting
State v. Lloyd, 103 Idaho 382, 383, 647 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1982)). The evidence
showed that all the property in question was stolen from one individual at the
same time, transported by Major and her associates off the reservation where
one item was sold the a pawn shop, then the rest of the property was transported
back to the reservation. Major, 111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119. The Court
ultimately concluded that Major committed "but one offense" of possession of
stolen property, and therefore "the amendment to the information adding the
property recovered from the pawn shop under the same offense was
permissible."

~

at 415, 725 P.2d at 120. Tellingly, at no point in Major, or in

Lloyd, the case relied on, does the Court claim that the rule it ultimately applied,
whereby the state may aggregate theft offenses, is of constitutional origin or
significance.
To show fundamental error Knutsen bears the burden of demonstrating a
violation of unwaived constitutional rights, that the error is clear, and that the
error is prejudicial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80
(2010). Knutsen has failed to show fundamental error because he has failed to
show that under the correct constitutional standard there is error, much less clear
and prejudicial error.

Application of the double jeopardy legal standards as

articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States leads to the conclusion
that the four counts were not the "same offense" because none is a lesser
included of the others. There is thus no constitutional error, much less is that
error clear on the record.
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There is one opinion, not cited by Knutsen, that the state wishes to
address.

In State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 533, 300 P.3d 61, 65 (Ct. App.

2013), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[c]onsistent with" Supreme Court
precedent "it is generally held" that where "multiple acts against the same victim"
occur "during a single criminal episode" the "'offense' is typically the episode" and
not the individual acts that would "independently support a conviction for the
same offense."

This assertion does not withstand analysis because the

conclusion that double jeopardy focuses on the "episode" instead of the "offense"
is not "consistent with" Supreme Court precedent, and is in fact entirely
inconsistent with that precedent.

Even if this standard were the law, its

application does not show fundamental error in this case.
In Blockburger the defendant asserted that his convictions for two counts
of the illegal sale of narcotics violated double jeopardy because they "constitute a
single continuing offense" because they were "made to the same purchaser and
following each other, with no substantial interval of time between the delivery of
the drug in the first transaction and the payment for the second quantity sold."
284 U.S. at 301-02. 10 The Court rejected this argument, stating that because
"the first sale was consummated," the second sale, "however closely following,"
was a "separate and distinct sale completed by its delivery."

kl

The Court

distinguished between "a continuous offense, having duration," and "an offense
consisting of an isolated act."

kl

at 302 (internal citations and quotations

This analysis is in a different part of the opinion than the part generally cited for
the "Blockburger test" for whether a single act may be subject to two criminal
sanctions.
10
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omitted).

Because the statute in question did not criminalize "the business of

selling the forbidden drugs," but instead "penalizes any sale made," "[e]ach of
several successive sales constitute a distinct offense, however closely they may
follow each other."

kl

"The test is whether the individual acts are prohibited or

the course of action they constitute. If the former, then each act is punishable .
separately. *** If the latter, there can be but one penalty."

kl

(internal quotes

omitted, asterisks original).
The analysis in Blockburger is clearly at odds with a general rule that the
offense is generally the episode instead of the act.

Rather, the offense is

whatever the legislature has defined the offense as. If it has defined the offense
as a course of action, the offense is a course of action. Where, as here, the
offense is defined as a particular act, the offense is a particular act, and
committing multiple prohibited acts in rapid succession against the same victim
does not transform the legislative definition of the crime.
The Court of Appeals' rule that committing multiple crimes against a single
victim in rapid succession converts those crimes into a single offense for double
jeopardy purposes is also not "consistent with the Brown analysis." Moffat, 154
Idaho at 533, 300 P.3d at 65.

The Brown analysis started with applying the

Blockburger test and concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause "forbids
successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser
included offense." Brown, 432 U.S. at 169.
The Court then turned to the Ohio court holding that because the date
specified in the first charge was the last day of the joy ride (the date of his arrest)
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while the date in the second charge was limited to the first day (the day he took
the car), the "prosecutions are based on two separate acts ... , one of which
occurred on November 29 th and one which occurred on December 8th ."
164.

kl

at

The Court rejected the conclusion "Brown could be convicted of both

crimes because the charges against him focused on different parts of this 9-day
joyride."

kl

at 169.

Because the applicable statutes made "the theft and

operation of a single car a single offense," the Double Jeopardy implications
could not be avoided by "the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a
series of temporal or spacial units."

kl

In a subsequent case the Court pointed

out that the "very same conduct" underlay both convictions for joyriding and
automobile theft because "[e]very moment of [Brown']s conduct was as relevant
to the joyriding charge as it was to the auto theft charge." Garrett, 471 U.S. at
787.
The analysis employed by the Supreme Court of the United States is
clear. A conviction for two crimes cannot stand if the crimes are actually the
"same offense" because the convictions are for included offenses. Offenses are
not included offenses if they arise out of the same criminal act if each offense
has an element not found in the other.

Likewise, offenses are not included

offenses if they arise from different criminal acts.
Both of these analyses apply here, but particularly the latter.

Knutsen

perpetrated four different acts of sexual abuse under two statutory provisions.
Each crime was proved by evidence of an independent act. The separate acts
were not included offenses of each other and conviction on one did not mean
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conviction on all, nor did acquittal on one mean acquittal on all. "Every minute
that Nathaniel Brown drove or possessed the stolen automobile he was
simultaneously committing both the lesser included misdemeanor and the greater
felony, but the same simply is not true of [Knutsen].". lQ,_ at 789.

It is not

"consistent" with Brown, and is directly contrary to Blockburger, to mash separate
criminal acts into one offense merely because they were perpetrated in rapid
succession on the same victim.
There is no constitutional requirement that this Court deem Knutsen's
actions a single offense.

It is the legislature's prerogative to define what

constitutes an offense, and the legislature's definition did not create a course of
conduct offense-it created a single act offense.

Because each of Knutsen's

acts was a separate offense, his convictions and sentences on four counts do not
implicate double jeopardy, and he has failed to show fundamental error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the
lower court.
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